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CAN A WHOLE BE GREATER THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS? 
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF “EMERGENCE” 
We address the concept of emergence, examining its historical roots and use in the field. We 
examine the ontological underpinnings of one way emergence is discussed, which we call 
objective-emergence and define as the existence of a higher-level entity which cannot be reduced 
to its parts. We note that objective-emergence is not scientifically feasible and may inhibit 
theoretical and empirical work. We describe research contexts and language that may 
accidentally foster the use of objective-emergence. Can a Whole Ever be Greater   3 
The concept of emergence has captured attention across a variety of disciplines, such as 
anthropology, biology, cybernetics, mathematics, philosophy, physics, psychology, and 
sociology (e.g., Anderson, 1972; Goldstein, 1999; Jantsch, 1980; Juarrero, 1999; Kauffman, 
1993; Kontopoulos, 1993; Marion, 1999; Phelan, 1999; Polanyi, 1968; Richardson, 2004; 
Skyttner, 2001; Weinberg, 1975). Having a basis in early works by psychological and 
evolutionary theorists (e.g., Lewes, 1874-79; Lloyd Morgan, 1923, 1926, 1933), this literature is 
often rooted in thought from within systems and complexity theory (e.g., Simon, 1962/1981; von 
Bertalanffy, 1968) and shares historical roots with work on communicative and statistical 
mechanics (e.g., Ashby, 1956; Schrödinger, 1944; Shannon & Weaver, 1949; Weaver, 1948). 
Often, within these diverse literatures, emergence is defined as a process which manifests 
phenomena existing at a level of analysis higher than that of their constituent parts, phenomena 
which are irreducible to such parts (Corning, 2002; Holland, 1997; Sulis, 2004). According to the 
concept’s originator, “The emergent is unlike its components in so far as these are 
incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum…” (Lewes, 1874–79: 413).  
With such an interesting and powerful theoretical concept which is, concurrently, so 
broadly defined, it is no wonder that a great many views on emergence have been espoused and 
debated using a plethora of theoretical foci and underlying logics (e.g., Axelrod & Cohen, 1999; 
Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977). This is no less true within management and organization science 
(see Dooley, 2002; Letiche & Boje, 2001), where emergence and the resulting “collective 
constructs,” or “emergents,” have been recruited to aid in understanding complex organizational 
systems (e.g., Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999). Although not all literature on organizational 
systems espouses emergence, focusing somewhat more strictly on the elemental nature of higher-
level wholes (e.g., James, Joyce, & Slocum, 1988; Lindell & Brandt, 2000), notable works have Can a Whole Ever be Greater   4 
used emergence as an important process by which to understand the formation of higher-order 
constructs (e.g., Glick, 1985; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). 
Within management and organizational studies, however, there has been little literature 
critical of emergence. As a result, researchers seem to have accepted the existence of emergent 
processes, processes which, because of their radical departure from traditional scientific 
principles of reductionism, demand a thorough defense. This has lead to discussions of 
emergence that may leave many researchers wondering just exactly what emergence is, what it is 
not, and how it may be understood scientifically. The current work attempts to fill this gap for 
scholars who engage in organizational research, research which (a) relies heavily on 
understanding the composition of constructs across levels of analysis (see Chan, 1998) and (b) 
requires developing and testing theories that address phenomena in organizational hierarchies 
(Dansereau, Yammarino, & Kohles, 1999; Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994). Our discussion 
unfolds by providing an exposition of how emergence is discussed in management and 
organization science. Then, a treatment of emergence is given that is critical of the concept. 
Next, in light of this treatment, we explore reasons why emergence is so appealing and ways 
researchers may avoid the temptation of theorizing emergence. We conclude by noting that 
emergence is not scientifically feasible, may act to inhibit meaningful theoretical and empirical 
work, and therefore should not be discussed further. 
EMERGENCE IN MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 
Although there are many ways to conceptualize the process of emergence and the 
resulting collective constructs (e.g., Krackhardt, 1994; McKelvey, 1997), here we discuss two 
perspectives which provide for a stark contrast of ways to think about emergence. First, 
Schneider (1975) explores the notion that, in an attempt to find closure and meaning, individuals Can a Whole Ever be Greater   5 
may perceive a whole out of many distinct parts, a whole which may not be reducible to such 
parts. Here, we call this type of emergence “perceptual-emergence.” In this view (see Schneider 
& Reichers, 1983), a whole emerges from the fragmented perceptions of individuals. Thus, 
perceptual-emergence does not mean that a metaphysical shift of levels has occurred, but, rather, 
it describes the mental processes of individuals who perceive collective wholes. 
Research exploring the perception of collective wholes by individuals has a basis in 
Gestalt principles of object perception (see Campbell, 1958). For example, work on 
“entitativity,” defined as the degree to which a collection of individuals are perceived as a unique 
and differentiable social entity (i.e., a group; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996), notes that individuals 
may perceive collective wholes when individual parts are similar, physically proximal, and share 
common fate (e.g., Yzerbyt, Cornielle, & Estrada, 2001). Thus, perceptual-emergence may be 
used to describe the cognition of individuals within organizational hierarchies. However, this 
view of emergence never posits a higher-level whole separate from its lower-level parts. 
Perceptual-emergence clearly defines emergent phenomena as inherently rooted at the 
level of the individual, rather than having an existence which is in any way outside of the 
individual. When positing perceptual-emergence, the linkage between individuals and emergent 
wholes is clear: perceived emergent structures are in no way separate from the individuals who 
perceive them—emergents are in the minds of individuals, rather than in any external reality. 
However, in the second view of emergence, it is suggested that real, higher-order 
phenomena may emerge from lower-level units and have an existence outside that of their 
constituent parts (see Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999). We refer to this form of emergence as 
“objective-emergence.” This view is different from that described by Schneider (1975). In the 
objective-emergence perspective, higher-order entities are thought to emerge from their lower-Can a Whole Ever be Greater   6 
level elements through the unique interrelations and interactions among such elements, but they 
also have a real existence outside of them. 
To provide a basis for objective-emergence requires that “the constructs that emerge can 
have a reality that is partly independent of the interaction that gave rise to them” (Morgeson & 
Hofmann, 1999, p. 251). This means that the existence of a discrete entity, which is apart from 
its constituent interactions, must be endowed with a real existence. Other descriptions of such a 
type of emergence are: “As interaction occurs within larger groups of individuals, a structure of 
collective action emerges that transcends the individuals who constitute the collective” (p. 252, 
emphasis added) and “Collective structures emerge, are transmitted, and persist through the 
actions of members of the collective (or the collective as a whole)” (p. 253, emphasis added).  
With the objective-emergence description of emergent phenomena, it should be clear that 
any scientist who would like to come to terms with the empirical ramifications of such thinking 
runs into the difficulty of measuring and explaining the discrete emergent entities described. In 
fact, this view of emergence, inasmuch as it leads to a lack of affiliation between the objectively-
emergent and its constituent elements, makes it somewhat impossible to define the criteria upon 
which objectively-emergent phenomena may be empirically disconfirmed (cf., Popper, 1959). In 
other words, the process of objective-emergence seems to be in prima facie contradiction with 
the scientific criterion of empirical verifiability, because it holds that entities can appear without 
giving an empirical basis for their appearance—the objectively-emergent exists, in part, 
separately from its constituent elements. 
IS THERE A VALID ONTOLOGICAL BASIS FOR EMERGENCE? 
One multilevel issue that the concept of objective-emergence tries to resolve is that some 
phenomena seem to appear at higher levels of analysis, but not at their constituent levels (see Can a Whole Ever be Greater   7 
Heylighen, 1989, Simon, 1962/1981; Turchin, 1977). However, objective-emergence presents a 
theoretical problem for scholars because it requires addressing the age-old scientific question of 
whether researchers are justified in reducing higher-level phenomena to their lower-level parts 
(e.g., James et al., 1988), or, instead, whether higher-level phenomena must be discussed as 
partially or fully independent of their lower-level parts (e.g., Glick, 1985).  
We may locate the roots of the above theoretical difference in historic debates, from the 
natural sciences, between mechanistic and organicist paradigms in describing natural systems 
(for a review, see Haraway, 1976; Koslowski & Klein, 2000). According to the former view, 
scientific description ultimately must characterize wholes in terms of their parts, describing in 
detail the processes by which elemental or “atomic” parts compose larger objects or systems. In 
contrast, organicist views, emanating primarily from biological and ecological sciences (e.g., 
Harrison, 1969; Weiss, 1969), as well as sociology (e.g., Merton, 1949, Parsons, 1951), stress the 
importance of considering systems primarily, and interpreting elemental components in terms of 
a system’s functio ning. Thus, organicist conceptions of systems and organization leave behind 
the atomistic perspective and view systems as unified wholes.  
The literature in management and organization science that addresses objective-
emergence prompts a recapitulation of the differences between these two world-views. 
Mechanistic conceptions give either complete or at least primary dominance to lower-level 
phenomena as the locus of higher-order constructs, such as organizational climate (e.g., James et 
al, 1988). Alternatively, organicist conceptions claim elemental status for higher-order wholes, 
such as institutions and cultures (e.g., Glick, 1985; Morand, 1995). The concept of objective-
emergence has often been invoked in support of the latter camp, as a justification for the 
reluctance to reduce group or organizational phenomena to lower-level constituents (e.g., Can a Whole Ever be Greater   8 
Marion, 1999; Simon, 1962/1981; Zimmerman, Lindberg, & Plsek, 1998); if “the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts,” then researchers have reason to give ontological primacy to wholes. 
The problem with the latter view is that objective-emergence seems to rely on a kind of 
transcendence that is difficult to justify scientifically. Although researchers from the biological 
sciences (e.g., Needham, 1968; Weiss, 1969), Gestalt psychology (e.g., Koffka, 1935; Kohler, 
1961), and organizational fields of research (e.g., Simon, 1962/1981) have long observed what 
appear to be qualities of systems that are distinct from the qualities of the parts of the systems, 
this observation demands theoretical elaboration. These “holistic” explanations have tended to 
account for such observations by two means. First, the higher-level phenomena are described as 
fundamental units rather than as composed of lower-level units, referred to as specification of the 
construct at a higher level of analysis (e.g., organizational versus psychological climate [Glick, 
1985]). Second, the composition of the higher-order construct from lower level constructs is 
acknowledged and often described (e.g., the “double interacts” of Weick, 1979; the dyadic 
interaction of Berger and Luckmann, 1966), with lower-level interactions providing a basis for 
the construction of larger social systems (e.g., Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Morgeson and 
Hofmann, 1999; Goodman, 2000). 
  The first strategy, which treats higher-order phenomena as fundamental units and studies 
their behavior, evolution, and dynamics, has strong roots in the sociological tradition initiated by 
Durkheim’s (1982) discussion of institutions as “social facts.” While we present no argument 
against this perspective, we should note that it, either implicitly or explicitly, ignores constituent 
parts or simply chooses to begin theoretical and empirical analyses at one particular level of 
analysis. Rather than attempting to explain what parts constitute a given whole, this perspective 
assumes the whole has some intrinsic value or meaning as a basis for further investigation. Thus, Can a Whole Ever be Greater   9 
this approach is not truly multilevel in nature, but is a sensible approach to theory development 
and empirical analyses because it provides researchers a basis for drawing investigative 
boundaries that allow maintaining theoretical and empirical parsimony.    
  The second strategy, that of attempting to describe both an objectively-emergent 
phenomenon and its constituent parts, is truly multilevel in that it attempts to bridge the gap 
between lower- and higher-level constructs by postulating a mechanism through which lower-
level phenomena translate into higher-level phenomena. Thus, for example, Morgeson and 
Hofmann (1999) describe collective structures as “open interaction systems” (p. 252), where 
individuals’ interactions create a kind of scaffolding that appears to us as a collective construct: 
“…the structure of any given collective (e.g., a work team) can be viewed as a series of 
ongoings, events, and event cycles between the component parts (e.g., individuals). This 
structure, in turn, forms the basis for the eventual emergence of collective constructs.” (p. 252) 
 
Morgeson and Hofmann (1999) are here attempting to demystify the notion of collective 
constructs by explaining objectively-emergent phenomena as outcomes of lower-level 
interactional patterns. Because of this, to better understand objective-emergent phenomena, they 
continue by recommending researchers use structural-functionalist accounts of system 
phenomena. Such accounts require specifying the interactional patterns and functional roles of 
systems parts which give rise to objectively-emergent wholes. 
Upon closer inspection, however, implicit in the above quote is the idea that such 
specification is not adequate to tell the whole story about collective phenomena. Notice, for 
example, the slippage of transcendental properties into passage: patterns of action form the 
“basis” for a collective construct that “emerges” from the pattern. One might ask, “What exactly 
is it that emerges from the patterns if the patterns are not themselves the collective construct we 
wish to measure?” Is there anything that emerges from these patterns that was not already Can a Whole Ever be Greater   10 
contained in the elements which fit together to produce the larger social picture? Given the tenets 
of the empirical sciences (cf., Popper, 1959), which do not allow for the metaphysical ontology 
required for structures to exist apart from their constitutive elements, we must conclude that 
objective-emergence is a rather nonsensical process, or at unscientific. 
To be clear, we are not accusing theorists of objective-emergence to be overtly 
postulating “ghosts in the machine” of lower-level interactions. Further, we are sensitive to the 
fact that these theorists are attempting nothing more than to advance our thinking across levels in 
order to improve theory and empirical work. However, the tendency to fall into a reified view of 
social structures is ever-present, and such views are both tacitly encouraged by concepts such as 
objective-emergence and are not helpful for management and organization science. For example, 
even though Morgeson and Hofmann (1999) explicitly reject the teleologism, or purposefulness, 
of some systems views (e.g., Merton, 1949), their proposal of using structural-functionalist 
accounts of multilevel systems in the presence of objective-emergence becomes problematic. 
Even within a purely structural-functional view, allowing for objective-emergence leads to the 
impossibility of specifying the area “in-between” lower and higher levels because of the lack of 
specificity of the term “emergence” and the implicit metaphysical implications that it carries, 
whether openly teleological or not (cf., Haraway, 1976). 
To fully rule out objective-emergence, however, requires considering its tenability in 
systems that are the most amenable to it. For example, Silberstein and McGeever (1999) note 
that objective-emergence (which they term “ontological emergence”) is a tenable hypothesis 
within the domain of quantum mechanics, where phenomena such as particle “entanglement” 
indicates processes that fly somewhat in the face of general relativity theory’s proposition that 
nothing may exceed the speed of light (see Aspect, Grangier, & Roger, 1982). By exceeding this Can a Whole Ever be Greater   11 
theoretical speed limit, these authors then propose that particle entanglement provides support 
for objective-emergence. Based on the notion that objective-emergence is a tenable hypothesis in 
the domain of quantum mechanics, these authors then cleverly trap the reader by noting: 
“…either everything is reducible to fundamental physics or it is not. If it is reducible, if 
everything is quantum mechanical, then ontological emergence is ubiquitous, as we have 
shown. If, on the other hand, the macroscopic is not reducible to the microscopic, if 
quantum effects really are screened off, then the entire world of classical objects is 
somehow ontologically emergent. In short, ontological emergence is most probably a real 
feature of the world.” (p. 200)  
 
We levy four arguments against accepting these authors’ position. First, the verdict is still 
out regarding the tenability of objective-emergence within quantum mechanical systems (see 
Price, 1994; Wick, 1995). Second, even though physicists have had tremendous trouble 
connecting the realities of quantum and classical objects, developments within “superstring 
theory” have been successful at providing theoretical linkages between the two that violate 
neither the theoretic paradigm underlying quantum mechanics nor general relativity (e.g., Green, 
Schwarz, Witten, 1987). Thus, the seemingly differential functioning of classical and quantum 
objects may not be cause to posit the objective-emergence of classical objects from quantum 
reality. Third, and more relevant to management and organization science, even if objective-
emergence truly exists on a quantum level, and relenting that classical objects in our world are 
objectively-emergent, the levels of “individual” and “group” both already exist within the world 
of classical objects. Thus, any quantum-physical reality of objective-emergence, and the 
objective-emergence of classical objects, cannot inform the process linking individuals to groups 
and, therefore, cannot be used as a metaphor for objective-emergence in larger, social systems. 
Fourth, and still allowing the idea that objective-emergence may be a reality at the quantum level 
and classical objects may be objectively-emergent, objective-emergence is simply not useful for 
the management and organizational sciences. Failing to rely on principles of reduction will lead Can a Whole Ever be Greater   12 
us no closer to understanding the real, measurable processes and phenomena that exist within the 
world of work and organization—managers and organizations require real solutions to their 
problems, not metaphysical talk about objectively-emergent entities, the basis for which is 
necessarily mysterious and metaphysical. 
In conclusion, we can either characterize organizational systems by their parts, the full 
complexity of their interactions, and their exchanges with the environment or we cannot. If we 
can, then ontological-emergence does not exist. If we cannot, then organizational systems are not 
real entities. In other words, the principles which we must adopt in order to accept ontological-
emergence as a possibility render the objects of our study invalid. Therefore, we propose that the 
costs of accepting ontological-emergence are so high as to render it useless for management and 
organization science. 
WHY IS OBJECTIVE-EMERGENCE SO APPEALING? 
  Given the scientific difficulties associated with objective-emergence, and the inability of 
the most tenable argument for objective-emergence to provide support for the concept, one may 
wonder why scholars have allowed objective-emergence to remain within their accounts of 
organizational systems. Here, we explore two possible reasons we see for objective-emergence 
being popular within management and organization science. We base our reasons on two key 
observations: (a) scholars are human perceivers, subject to Gestalt rules of object perception, and 
(b) organizational systems are tremendously complex and, therefore, difficult to describe. 
Perceiving a Whole from Parts 
  It is notable that management and organization scholars are, just as all of us, human 
beings. As noted above, all humans rely on Gestalt principles of object perception to navigate 
their physical and social worlds (Köhler, 1959). These principles guiding perception suggest that Can a Whole Ever be Greater   13 
various heuristics are used to infer the existence of  meaningful groups from collections of 
individual units(Dasgupta, Banaji, & Abelson, 1999; Schneider, 1975). As noted above, these 
heuristics include properties of lower-level parts, such as their similarity, proximity, and 
common fate (Campbell, 1958). Given these heuristics, it is likely that scholars themselves 
perceive what appear as objectively-emergent systems from a series of parts—or at least they can 
relate to the concept in their “gut”—and, based on this perception, have incorporated objective-
emergence into their theories of organizational systems and processes. 
  Such an understanding of the reason for positing objective-emergence is sensible given 
the manner in which researchers often justify interpreting an agglomeration of parts as collective 
wholes. Consider, for example, within-group agreement (WGA) as a method for interpreting a 
group of individuals as a meaningful system. As individuals become more proximal within the 
construct space of interest (i.e., as they become more similar), we are more likely to observe high 
levels of WGA (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984) and, based on such WGA, we are more likely 
to interpret the individuals as a meaningful group (Dasgupta et al., 1999). 
  An important point to make regarding this practice is that indices of WGA are simply 
operationalizations of the Gestalt principles we use for everyday object perception—although 
this does not mean that WGA is not a very useful index with meaningful antecedents and 
consequences (see Klein, Conn, Smith, Sorra, 2001; Patterson, Payne, & West, 1996). Based on 
the fact that the methods we utilize for the purposes of multilevel research rely on our natural 
Gestalt principles of object perception, it is reasonable to believe that our reliance upon such 
principles also permeates our theoretical postulations regarding multilevel phenomena and 
processes, leading to the postulation of objective-emergence.  
Organizations are Complex Systems Can a Whole Ever be Greater   14 
  Another reason multilevel researchers may posit objective-emergence is because the 
concept may have somewhat of a relief-valve function when approaching complex 
organizational systems. If objective-emergence is real, then we may not have to trouble ourselves 
with looking at the infinite complexity of parts and their interactions, because they do not fully 
compose the larger system. This reason for positing objective-emergence has been described 
elsewhere as epistemological-emergence (e.g., Silberstein & McGeever, 1999), the point of 
which is that organizational systems are so complex that we can’t possibly hope to account for 
all of their parts and their interactions. Therefore, we invoke a process of emergence to aid in the 
simplification of our objects of study. 
  Support for such a proposition comes in the form of extensive theory and empirical 
findings which note that individuals use heuristics to simplify their worlds for the purposes of 
decision making and attitude formation (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986; Tetlock, 1983), and that such simplification is positively associated with 
affective outcomes (e.g., Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). In the face of the complexity scholars 
face when addressing organizational systems, it is logical to expect that some simplification 
processes are likely to occur, even if such simplifications are not allowed by the ontology of the 
empirical sciences. In our view, such simplification is not only understandable, but it is required 
for limiting the scope of theoretical and empirical endeavors which span multiple levels—as 
noted by Klein and Kozlowski (2000), without developing a focus precise enough to be 
adequately parsimonious, multilevel research endeavors may easily spin out of control. However, 
the cost of such simplification should not be our ontological footing within empirical science 
and, therefore, we should not allow objective-emergence to permeate our literature.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION SCHOLARS Can a Whole Ever be Greater   15 
  Given both the inability of objective-emergence to exist outside the domain of 
metaphysics and the likely causes of objective-emergence’s integration into our science, the 
implications for multilevel researchers are centered in their ability to overcome possible reasons 
for considering objective-emergence and eliminating jargon which seems to imply objective-
emergence. To doff the notion of objective-emergence, and as explored by other scholars (e.g., 
Klein & Kozlowski, 2000; Klein et al., 1994), multilevel researchers should first attempt to 
maintain an awareness of the complexity inherent in their research. To focus such awareness, we 
(a) propose three possible causes of perceiving objective-emergence when confronting systems 
commonly encountered in organizations, (b) show that our multilevel data-analytic techniques 
may imply objective-emergence, and (c) provide an example of how language used in the 
management and organization sciences can forward the notion of objective-emergence. 
Complementary, Supplementary, and Interactive Functioning 
  One possible reason for perceiving objective-emergence is the fact that many systems 
function in a way not allowed by any single element in isolation. In such complementary and 
interactive systems it is true that the individual parts, when put together, do not function in the 
same way as when alone, but it is not the case that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. 
An example of such a system is a team operating with a distributed, unshared knowledge base 
across its members. Such a transactive memory system within a team, where the team may only 
be effective when all members contribute their unshared knowledge (Austin, 2003; 
Hollingshead, 1998), may give the false impression that there is an objectively-emergent effect 
within the team. However, although the team functions in a way which could not be 
accomplished by any of the members on their own, the team’s functioning is reducible to the 
independent contributions and interactions among its members; transactive memory and other, Can a Whole Ever be Greater   16 
similar systems do not lead to phenomena which are objectively-emergent. Researchers 
examining such systems should not be tempted to assert an independent higher-level entity 
simply because the team members have complementary functions and interact with one another. 
  Supplementary organizational systems act differently than those which are 
complementary and interactive, but they have the same implications for researchers in terms of 
avoiding objective-emergence. Consider, for example, individual affect within a group. It is well 
known that affect can “spill over” from one person to another within a group (cf., Kelly & 
Barsade, 2001), called affect or emotion contagion (Hatfield, Cacciopo, & Rapson, 1994). Such a 
spillover process will have a homogenizing effect along affectivity within a group (Hackman, 
1992; George, 1990). As noted above, one might view such homogenization as indicating a 
meaningful group effect existing across the individuals of interest. Such a postulate is 
reasonable, given the correlates of homogeneity within groups (see Klein et al., 2001), and it is 
certainly reasonable to proceed with group-level investigations given the presence of WGA if the 
group level is the research focus. However, explorations of “the effect of the group” or “effects 
at the group level” should not understood as if a separate group level is operating “on” the 
individuals that compose the group. Instead, such explorations must be undertaken knowing that 
the group is composed of real individuals who, in the absence of facilitative or inhibitory 
environmental conditions, may be thought of as fully accounting for the affective contagion 
observed—although adequately modeling the complexity of such a process may be difficult or 
impossible. 
Contextual Effects 
  Another possible reason for perceiving objective-emergence is the fact that within 
complex systems there are often legitimate, higher-level influences on lower-level parts, or Can a Whole Ever be Greater   17 
contextual effects (Mossholder & Bedeian, 1983). Such effects may be able to account for 
influences on individuals unseen in their interactions with others, influences which may lead to 
researchers proposing objectively-emergent effects. For example, consider a team of individuals 
who rapidly socialize new members, but who appear to not put much effort into new-member 
socialization. Such a rapid process of socialization, in conjunction with individuals’ lack of effort 
to do so, may lead a researcher to believe a higher-order entity has objectively-emerged from the 
lower-level parts to influence incoming members. In this case it is likely that non-compositional 
higher-order influences are aiding the socialization process, such as human resource policies and 
strategically-composed symbolic environments (Trice & Beyer, 1993), but such influences do 
not occur because of a metaphysical shift of levels. Such influences, such as policy decisions, 
resource endowments, or organizational structural features may be objectively specified as 
separate level effects, because they originate at a different level, and are not entirely composed 
of “parts” at lower levels. Thus, researchers should be constantly vigilant for contextual effects 
which may be able to explain away appearances of objective-emergence.  
Construct (Mis)Specification at Lower Levels 
Researchers may be tempted to explore objective-emergence as a reasonable postulate 
when they observe different effects among variables at different levels of analysis. Consider, for 
example, Ostroff’s (1992) finding that the satisfaction-performance link appeared at the 
organizational-level, rather than at the individual-level. This effect may be understood as being 
due to the fact that helping behaviors aiding the organization were not reflected in individual 
performance ratings (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993). However, if these behaviors were important 
for organizational functions, one should ask why they were not included in the performance 
evaluations of the people that carried out the activities. Although, as Katz (1964) noted, it is Can a Whole Ever be Greater   18 
practically difficult for jobs to be constructed that take into account all their functional 
properties, part of this difficulty may be due to the fact that job-specification methods often do 
not consider the organization or industry-level importance of functions in the job-analytic 
process (Ployhart & Schneider, 2002), more often relying on micro-level, critical incident 
behaviors and expert description rather than a more system-integrative view (Harvey, 1991). In 
the domain of job analysis, this means an overemphasis on conservative definitions of jobs at the 
individual-level may lead to the illusion of objective-emergent effects at the group level. More 
generally, this means that effects at higher levels of analysis, which are not observed at lower 
levels, may be due to construct specifications which do not take into account system-relevant 
aspects of the construct at the lower level (Berson, Avolio, & Kahai, 2003). Thus, researchers 
should reject postulating objective-emergence in favor of examining their constructs for 
misspecification at lower levels of analysis. 
Multilevel Data-Analytic Techniques Imply Objective-Emergence 
  Another reason researchers may be wont to explore emergent effects is the way some 
data-analytic technologies model nested observations. Consider, for example, the hierarchical 
linear model, or HLM (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). This modeling paradigm posits a 
variable Y  associated with a lower-level part  i nested in a unit  j . (i.e.,  ij Y ). Then, the unit effect 
j 0 b  is modeled as a determinant of the lower-level variable (see Hofmann, Griffin, & Gavin, 
2000). Such a model may be likened to a reflective measurement model, where all parts within 
the units are seen as equally valid indicators of the unit effect (see Mehta & Neale, 2005). In 
order words, the HLM modeling paradigm may lead researchers to implicitly assume that unit 
effects are latent and influence the lower-level parts within a unit in a “top-down” manner.  Can a Whole Ever be Greater   19 
  Such a modeling paradigm, and the underlying ontology it represents, has been critiqued 
as falsely represent the true state of affairs in group contexts. For example, Kenny and colleagues 
(Kenny, Mannetti, Pierro, Livi, & Kashy, 2002) note that influences of individuals within groups 
neither function in a “bottom-up” or “top-down” manner. Instead, individuals influence other 
individuals within their group and, thus, influence is lateral rather than vertical—even if 
individuals who influence each other exist in different levels of an organizational hierarchy 
(Brass, 1984). Therefore, statistical models not accounting for the lateral influences within 
groups may put researchers in a mindset ripe for contamination with objective-emergence. 
Our Jargon May Imply Objective-Emergence 
  The final comment we make regards how objective-emergence may be implicitly 
propagated within management and organization science is due to the language we often use in 
describing influence and effects in groups. As noted above, influence in groups is neither 
bottom-up or top-down (Kenny et al., 2002). However, the use of these terms is quite common 
and may give the false impression of objective-emergence. For example, in their thorough and 
precise treatise on emergent effects in groups, Kozlowski and Klein (2000) explore the notion 
that emergent effects are necessarily bottom-up, where individuals provide the elemental content 
for higher-level structures which are brought about via interactions among the individuals; “the 
form of the interaction process, in combination with the elemental content, comprises the 
emergent phenomenon” (p. 56). These authors then go on to provide great insights regarding the 
ways individuals may interact, the contextual factors constraining and shaping such interactions, 
and how these contribute towards different kinds of arrangements among individuals which may 
be meaningfully categorized in an attempt to describe the process of organizing (e.g., 
composition versus compilation models describing systems of individuals). Can a Whole Ever be Greater   20 
  Somewhat problematically, however, from such discussions researchers may be getting 
the false impression that individuals within groups have the capability of influencing some 
higher-order, objectively-emergent entity called “the group” or “the team.” This is not the case. 
Instead, (a) individuals may laterally influence each other (e.g., affect may “spill-over” from one 
person to the next; George, 1990), (b) individuals may upwardly influence truly higher-level 
phenomena (e.g., by placing symbols in the workplace which are viewed by all team members; 
CITE), and (c) truly higher-level phenomena may downwardly influence individuals (e.g., all 
individuals within an organization may be influenced by a human resources policy; CITE). 
However, it is not possible for an individual to influence a group or a team, unless what is meant 
by such a description is that the lateral influence of an individual on other individuals is complete 
across all who exist within the group or team. As noted by Kozlowski and Kein (2000), “the 
representation of an emergent construct is an effort to capture or freeze the result of a dynamic 
process” (p. 64). By this, we understand these scholars to mean that descriptions of higher-level 
constructs are useful for their heuristic value, and we wholeheartedly agree—again, see Klein et 
al.’s (2001) exploration of the theoretical and practical value of WGA for understanding sets of 
people. However, researchers should be wary of codifying such heuristics as ontological reality 
by allowing objective-emergence to subtly permeate their theories of organizational systems. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this review we have attempted to argue that the notion of objective-emergence in 
management and organization science is a misleading way to alleviate the concern over how to 
relate lower- and higher-level phenomena. The core of our argument is that the holism inherent 
in the concept of objective-emergence allows positing entities that cannot, in principle, be 
explained. If, on the one hand, objective-emergent phenomena are truly different than the Can a Whole Ever be Greater   21 
elements from which they are composed, then it seems that different levels of analysis are 
doomed to forever be irreconcilable; if, on the other hand, these compositions can be specified, 
then the construct of objective-emergence may occlude important aspects of organizational life. 
We believe that the latter explanation best characterizes objectively-emergent phenomenon. 
  As discussed above, however, it is important to stress that the difficulty posed by 
objective-emergence points to real epistemic problems that researchers must face when 
conceptualizing organizational phenomena. Social phenomena can be studied from a vast 
number of levels (some might say an infinite number [see Pfeffer, 1983]), from intra-individual 
phenomena to global-historical and economic phenomena, with an indefinite list of potential 
levels “in-between.” This means that researchers must isolate the levels of analysis that they 
believe can provide the most practical vantage point for the purposes of their research 
(Dansereau, Alluto, & Yammarino, 1984; House, Rousseau, & Thomas-Hunt, 1995). However, 
because of this, any such isolation will necessarily leave out some intervening process. 
  In conclusion, we have attempted to steer thought regarding multilevel phenomena in 
organizations towards a more scientifically valid location. This is important because the task of 
management and organization scholars goes to the heart of social science questions, dealing with 
the fundamental difficulties in understanding the relations between individuals, groups, 
organizations, industries, and economies (Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999). We have attempted to 
clarify the task at hand in dealing with these difficulties by noting that research that doesn’t 
allow connecting lower and higher levels of analysis, by allowing metaphysical processes such 
as objective-emergence, may hinder the development of management and organizational science. 
Only by paying serious attention to the real multilevel processes inherent in organizations, and 
avoiding entrees into metaphysics, may we further our field.  Can a Whole Ever be Greater   22 
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